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ABSTRACT 
Heavy involvement in international peacekeeping has put a drain on U.S. and 
U.N. resources and the future ability to field effective U.N. peacekeeping forces is 
questionable. If Latin American countries were able to support future peacekeeping 
operations in their region, as they do internationally, this would provide relief to the 
United Nations and the United States.  The purpose of this thesis is to determine what 
factors influence nations to participate in international peacekeeping and to predict 
whether participation in international peacekeeping will translate into successful regional 
peacekeeping.  This thesis examines the involvement of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in 
Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs). The thesis begins with a theoretical framework for 
analyzing peacekeeping participation using three major factors that affect the likelihood 
of a country’s involvement in peacekeeping:  1) civil-military relations, 2) foreign policy 
objectives, and 3) military budget and missions. Ultimately the thesis provides a model to 
predict which nations are likely to participate in international and regional peacekeeping 
missions in the future.  The conclusions of this thesis will be valuable to policy makers 
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In the past decade, the United Nations has been heavily involved in humanitarian 
and peacekeeping operations throughout the world. This heavy involvement has put a 
drain on U.N. resources and the future ability of the U.N. to field peacekeeping forces is 
at risk.  At the same time, U.N Secretary General Kofi Annan has called on regional 
organizations to increase their share of the burden in global peacekeeping.  His basic 
premise is that regional organizations should take primary responsibility for operations 
within their spheres of influence.  In the event of a peacekeeping intervention in Latin 
America it is safe to assume, based on historical precedent, that the U.N. might be 
expected to provide the majority of the resources in a multilateral operation.  Recent 
examples, however, show a capacity and willingness of certain Latin American 
governments to provide both personnel and leadership to multilateral military operations. 
If Latin American countries are in fact willing and able to provide the bulk of the forces 
for humanitarian interventions in the region, this would provide relief to the United 
Nations, and the United States, both of which will most likely already be burdened with 
humanitarian and peacekeeping commitments in other parts of the world. 
This thesis examines the involvement of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in 
peacekeeping operations both during the Cold War and in its aftermath. These nations are 
important to any future peacekeeping operation in Latin America because they are among 
the most capable armed forces in the region. Additionally, Argentina has been the most 
active Latin American country in international military operations in recent years. While 
Brazil has maintained a medium level of activity in (PKOs), it has experience in leading 
peacekeeping operations. Chile for its part has been traditionally reluctant to participate 
in PKOs on as large a scale as its neighbors, but with its well- funded and well-manned 
armed forces and increasing international pressure to take part in PKOs, it may become 
more of a factor in the future.   
The thesis will comprise five chapters beginning with a framework for examining 
factors that might affect each country’s decision to take part in international 
peacekeeping operations. Specifically, I hypothesize that three major factors affect the 
likelihood of a country becoming involved in international peacekeeping:  1) civil-
 x 
military relations, 2) foreign and economic policy objectives and 3) military budgets and 
missions. Civil-military relations are crucial to understand because it provides an 
understanding of who makes policy decisions in a given country. Foreign and economic 
policy objectives and military budgets and missions are important because they reflect the 
policy preferences of civilian and military decision makers respectively. The next three 
chapters analyze the peacekeeping participation of each nation, Argentina, Brazil, and 
Chile to test how these factors played into each nation’s decision to take part in 
peacekeeping operations. Each country chapter will begin with a brief overview of the 
country’s peacekeeping participation over the years. This will be followed by an analysis 
of how civil-military relations, foreign policy strategy, economic strategy, and finally the 
military budget and missions have shaped their decisions to participate in PKOs. The fifth 
chapter will focus on the additional factors that affect regional peacekeeping participation 
as well as provide overall conclusions and recommendations. The chapter is based on the 
research of Paul Diehl.  In his book International Peacekeeping, he provides one of the 
few theoretical perspectives on the characteristics of PKOs and specifically Diehl 
provides an explanation of how regional peacekeeping differs from international 
peacekeeping. Using a variation on Diehl’s analysis, chapter V analyzes the factors that 
are most likely to impact the participation of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in regional 
peacekeeping. 
  Using the results of the analysis in chapters II through V, the last part of chapter 
V provides conclusions for the overall study. Ultimately, Brazil demonstrates the greatest 
potential to lead a peacekeeping operation in Latin America. Argentina for its part will 
have to overcome major economic hurdles to be a major contributor to any future 
peacekeeping operation in the hemisphere. Finally, Chile will be unlikely to be a major 






The author would like to thank all the professors, especially Professors Giraldo 
and Trinkunas for their guidance and suggestions throughout the thesis process. 
Most importantly, thanks to my wife, Stephanie, for her support and patience 






























A.  FRAMEWORK 
The end of the Cold War resulted in a termination of the bipolar world order 
dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union since the end of World War II. 
Among the many consequences of the Cold War’s demise was the increased ability of the 
United Nations Security Council to reach consensus on issues of global importance. This 
increased consensus-building ability led to an unprecedented number of UN resolutions 
resulting in the deployment of peacekeeping troops to assist in the settlement of conflicts 
throughout the world. This increase in peacekeeping operations in turn created many 
opportunities for nations to participate in UN-sponsored military deployments. Nations as 
powerful as the United States and as powerless as Fiji all took part in peacekeeping 
operations on virtually every continent.   
Although the United Nations itself has no established definition of peacekeeping, 
it can be defined as “the deployment of unarmed or at most lightly-armed forces in a 
peaceful environment, normally to buttress a fragile or brittle political arrangement 
between two or more contending parties.”1 Peacekeeping as a United Nations function is 
outlined in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. With the deployment of the United 
Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) to monitor the peace after the Arab-
Israeli war of 1948, today’s modern peacekeeping regime was established. Since that 
time the United Nations has taken part in over fifty peacekeeping operations around the 
world.2 Additionally several other peacekeeping operations have been conducted by 
temporary international coalitions like the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) and 
the Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru (MOMEP) and by regional organizations 
such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS). Peacekeeping by third parties has clearly become an 
                                                 
1 Richard N. Haass, Intervention (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 57. 
2 The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (New York: United Nations, 
1996). 
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accepted norm in international relations, but what motivates nations to participate in these 
operations? 
The idea of an international community with members of equal status and equal 
responsibility is embodied in the United Nations General Assembly. As members of this 
community, countries are expected to take part in and support the UN’s activities. Given 
this logic, peacekeeping can be viewed as a duty of UN members to do their fair share in 
ensuring global peace and security. This fair share however does not explain the large 
contributions in relation to their size of such nations as Fiji, Bangladesh, or Uruguay. 
Conversely, large nations like Mexico or China participate very little in peacekeeping 
operations. Rather than participating in peacekeeping out of a utopian desire to show 
good will as a member of the international community, I propose nations have very 
concrete reasons for taking part in international peacekeeping operations.   
In order to understand a country’s reasons for participating in peacekeeping it is 
necessary to determine who participates in the decision making process, specifically 
whether it is civilians, military officers, or a combination of both. It is also necessary to 
know what the decision makers’ preferences are regarding peacekeeping participation, 
and how much influence they have in the decision making process. 
Different nations will have different interests at stake in peacekeeping operations. 
For some nations peacekeeping may be a way to gain recognition in the international 
community and to provide their military with a viable mission and additional training and 
equipment. On the other hand, a superpower like the United States will have different 
interests in peacekeeping. The United States may participate in peacekeeping in order to 
fulfill its role as a global leader. However, the United States may be expected to provide a 
bulk of the funding and personnel for peacekeeping operations, while the concrete 
benefits of participating may be less clear. This lack of concrete benefits may make it 
more difficult for a superpower to convince its population of the merits of involving its 
military in an operation in a far off land.  
Although nations have their own particular reasons for taking part in 
peacekeeping, I propose that for the majority of countries these reasons can be combined 
into three major factors: 1) the state of civil-military relations within the country (i.e., 
 3
whether civilians or military make decisions), 2) foreign policy and economic goals, and 
3) the military’s budget, roles and missions. 
Civil-military relations are the most important factor because in order to 
understand how a nation makes peacekeeping policy it is crucial to know who in the 
government holds the power to make these decisions. In a nation where civilian control 
over the military is strong, peacekeeping decisions will be made based on civilian 
interests. On the other hand, where the military maintains a high degree of autonomy in 
determining the missions they will perform, peacekeeping policy will be made more on 
the basis of military interests. Knowing where the balance of power lies between civilian 
and military leaders in a country is the first place to start when analyzing peacekeeping 
policy.  
After understanding who makes decisions then one can analyze the major factors 
shaping the preferences of the decision maker. For civilian decision makers these 
preferences are likely to be shaped by their general foreign policy goals, their economic 
strategy, and possibly their desire to divert the military from internal tasks. For military 
decision makers, the assessment of the internal and external threat situation, their desire 
to obtain resources, and their view of proper roles and missions for the military would 
likely determine their preferences with respect to peacekeeping. The following section 
will discuss more in depth the aforementioned factors and explain why these factors are 
important. 
B. FACTORS IN PEACEKEEPING POLICY  
1. Civil-Military Relations  
The state of civil-military relations is likely to be a major factor in a nation’s 
decision to participate in peacekeeping because outcomes may be different depending on 
who is making the ultimate decision. Knowing who makes the decisions is the first step 
in predicting what the decisions will likely be. This is particularly important in countries 
that became democracies during the “third wave of democratization”3 that swept through 
                                                 
3 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
(Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993) 
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much of the world after the Cold War because in these countries it is not always clear 
whether civilians maintain control over the military.  
The degree of civilian control over the military varies greatly within these new 
democracies. As a result, the ability of civilian leaders to impose new missions (such as 
peacekeeping) on the military varies as well. Generally where the armed forces maintain 
a high degree of autonomy and a traditional view of their role as soldiers peacekeeping 
participation will be minimal. This may be the case even in established democracies 
where the military is firmly subordinate to civilian rulers. For example in September 
1993, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell expressed his 
concern with the growing involvement of the US military in peacekeeping operations: 
“Notwithstanding all of the changes that have taken place in the world, not 
withstanding the new emphasis on peacekeeping, peace enforcement, 
peace engagement, preventive diplomacy, we have a value system and a 
culture system within the armed forces of the United States. We have this 
mission: to fight and win the nation’s wars…”4  
 
However, where civilians have greater control over the military establishment 
peacekeeping can become a prominent role, even in the face of military reluctance.  
While it is important to understand the overall dynamics of civil-military relations 
in a particular country, in order to accurately predict whether a nation is likely to take 
part in peacekeeping it is necessary to identify the civilian and military preferences with 
regard to peacekeeping. The following sections will look at these preferences more 
closely. 
2. Civilian Preferences  
a. Foreign Policy Goals 
A nation’s foreign policy goals are potential factors that influence nations 
to participate in international peacekeeping. Peacekeeping participation, like international 
participation in other areas, provides very tangible results for participants. Peacekeeping 
can provide international exposure for small nations who otherwise may not have the 
                                                 
4 Ivo H. Daalder, “Knowing when to say no: the development of US policy for peacekeeping” in 
UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990’s, ed. William J. Durch (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 41. 
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resources to stand out in the international arena. It can also provide international 
leadership opportunities for nations who are vying for recognition as regional leaders but 
who do not have the economic power necessary to achieve this goal. Finally, nations with 
aspirations to increased leadership in the international community (such as a permanent 
seat on the Security Council) may also use peacekeeping as a way to achieve their foreign 
policy goals. Ultimately these nations participate in international peacekeeping in order to 
improve their status in the global hierarchy and to achieve their foreign policy objectives. 
Nations with other means to achieve their foreign policy goals should be less likely to 
depend on peacekeeping for this purpose while those with fewer options may see it as a 
viable way to achieve their objectives.  
b. Economic Goals 
Closely related to foreign policy goals (and often a part of foreign policy) 
are a country’s economic goals. Much like foreign policy goals, peacekeeping can be 
used to further a nation’s economic goals by providing positive exposure in the 
international community. Countries that seek to enter the international economic arena 
and attract foreign investment in their country, but lack other means of gaining 
international exposure such as a well respected diplomatic corps or an already strong 
international economy, might further their goals in the economic sphere by peacekeeping 
participation.   
3. Military Preferences  
a. Military Budgets 
In as far as the military is concerned a potential major factor when 
considering peacekeeping participation is the state of the military budget. After the Cold 
War, many of the world’s armed forces saw a decline in budgets commensurate with the 
perceived decrease in foreign military threats. Peacekeeping operations can provide 
material incentives in the form of surplus equipment, realistic training, and individual 
compensation for the peacekeeping soldier. In a military where severe budget cuts result 
in antiquated equipment, poorly trained soldiers and decreased salaries, UN peacekeeping 
can mean a welcome supplement to a nation’s military capabilities. 
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b. Military Roles and Missions 
Along with the military’s budget, another important factor that can 
determine the military’s preferences regarding peacekeeping is the roles and missions of 
the military. With the end of the Cold War, many of the world’s armed forces lost a 
major external enemy, whether that was the United States or the Soviet Union. Unless the 
armed forces in these countries perceived other external threats besides the Cold War 
threats, or had internal missions to justify their existence, they may have found 
themselves searching for new missions. Peacekeeping might fill the void where armed 
forces are left without enough viable missions. In other words militaries may be more 
likely to accept peacekeeping if they feel the need to justify their existence. On the other 
hand, if the military is secure in their perception of their roles and missions they may be 
less likely to accept peacekeeping as a major mission area. 
4. Regional Peacekeeping Factors  
While the above-mentioned factors influence a nation’s decision to take part in 
international peacekeeping, nations often consider additional issues when deciding 
whether to participate in peacekeeping in their own region of the world because of the 
inherent differences in regional and international peacekeeping. A major difference 
between international and regional peacekeeping lies in the fact that nations usually have 
more at stake in their own region than they do in other regions of the world. Instability in 
a neighboring country may spread throughout the region or may affect the economic 
interests of the other countries making the resolution of the conflict in the interest of all 
nations in the region. On the other hand mounting a peacekeeping operation in a 
neighboring country may be viewed as intervention in the affairs of another nation and 
nations may be more cautious when deciding to deploy troops into neighboring territory.  
In International Peacekeeping, Paul F. Diehl lays out the characteristics of 
regional peacekeeping and what he believes are its potential advantages and 
disadvantages.5 As possible advantages he cites: a greater consensus-building ability, 
greater support from the disputants, better prospects for conflict resolution, and a superior 
                                                 
5 Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping  (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1993) 119-130. 
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ability to garner support of third parties. Diehl views as possible disadvantages: lack of 
resources, less developed organizations compared to the UN, compromise of neutrality, 
inability to meet extra-regional threats, and an inability to deal with a regional hegemon. 
In reviewing his advantages and risks of regional peacekeeping, and for the purposes of 
this thesis, three factors stand out as being of most importance, particularly in the case of 
Latin America: lack of resources, inability to deal with a regional hegemon, and 
compromise of neutrality. While his other factors are generally valid, in the case of Latin 
America they are less relevant. For example, regional organizations are often less 
developed in the area of peacekeeping than the UN, however the OAS is one of the few 
regional organizations that actually has experience in peacekeeping. Additionally, for the 
purpose of this thesis, which is determining a nation’s willingness to participate in 
peacekeeping many of his factors do not apply. 
The following factors are a variation on his views. I propose that the foremost 
factors that might affect a nation’s decision to engage in regional peacekeeping are 
funding of the operation, the existence of a regional hegemon, and the higher stakes 
involved for the participating nation. 
a. Operational Funding 
Unlike UN-sponsored operations, regional peacekeeping is funded either 
by a regional organization or by the participant nations themselves. In the recent 
multilateral peacekeeping operation in East Timor, INTERFET, Australia took the lead in 
deploying peacekeepers but ran into problems funding the operation without UN 
assistance. In order to fund the expedition, Australia introduced a special tax and the 
continuation of the operation was in jeopardy until the UN replaced the Australians after 
five months.6 The fact that the UN does not generally fund regional operations removes 
the “cash cow” image that some nations may have of international peacekeeping and may 
lead them to think twice about their participation. 
With the UN out of the funding loop for regional operations, it is left up to 
the regional organizations or the participants themselves to provide the funding. This may 
create a dilemma for participating nations. It would be particularly troublesome for those 
                                                 
6 Michael Hirsh, “Calling All Regiocops,” Foreign Affairs  79, no. 6 (Nov/Dec 2000): 2-8. 
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nations who see financial gain as a major motivator for taking part in peacekeeping. Even 
if nations do not intend to gain financially from the operations, they would have to 
consider whether they could afford participating at all if it were left to their own coffers. 
For their part regional organizations, unlike the UN, may not have the organizational 
structure, and therefore the budget, for peacekeeping. Cases of successful regional 
peacekeeping may require nations other than those participating to provide the funding. 
In the case of MOMEP, for example, the disputants, Peru and Ecuador, provided the 
funding, taking the pressure off the Organization of American States (OAS) and the 
peacekeepers.7 However, it is unlikely that this ideal situation will be replicated in the 
future. 
b. Regional Hegemon 
The existence of a nation with a comparatively greater amount of political, 
military, and economic power than others in the region will surely affect the other 
nations’ decisions to take part in peacekeeping. In the case of the Western Hemisphere, 
the presence of the United States in all regional matters cannot be overlooked by the 
other nations in the region. Often the regional hegemon can be the factor between the 
operation becoming a reality or not. In the Dominican Republic in 1965, the OAS-
sponsored Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) was made possible only with the funding 
and support of the United States.8 At times, the intervention of the hegemon will be 
desired by the other nations as this may mean the majority of the resources coming from 
the hegemon. However, at other times the presence of the hegemon may be a detractor in 
as much as the other nations may see the multilateral operation as a thinly veiled 
unilateral hegemonic intervention. Many in Latin America saw the IAPF as a U.S. 
operation with an OAS stamp on it.9     
                                                 
7 Marcella, Gabriel and Richard Downes, eds., Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: 
Resolving the Ecuador-Peru Conflict (Coral Gables, FL: North-South Center Press, 1999) 
 
8 Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping  (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1993) 121. 
9 Ibid.  
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Of course, the regional hegemon factor takes on a different light when the 
hegemon itself is making a decision about entering into an operation. In this case, 
regional peacekeeping may look like an attractive proposition because a regional or sub 
regional hegemon may have the ability to exert its power more freely than when acting as 
a part of the United Nations. Brazil can be considered a sub-regional hegemon relative to 
its South American neighbors. Although Brazil would still have to contend with the 
United States, it can do so from a position of relative power compared to other nations in 
the region. At the same time, the other nations must also consider Brazil’s power in the 
sub-region when confronting any regional peacekeeping operation. 
c. Higher Stakes for the Peacekeeping Participant 
Although there may sometimes be high stakes involved when a nation 
makes a decision regarding international peacekeeping, the likelihood of this is much 
greater when the operation is within a nation’s own region. When operations occur within 
a region, it is safe to assume that nations will greatly consider their own stakes in a 
particular country or countries before sending in peacekeeping forces. These interests 
could be political (e.g., whether the nation involved is considered an ally or adversary) or 
economic (e.g., amount of investments in that nation). The public may also have more of 
an opinion on and stake in regional peacekeeping compared to international 
peacekeeping, therefore posing an additional consideration for political decision makers. 
After providing a general framework for analyzing the factors of 
peacekeeping operations, it is necessary to study the specific cases of Argentina, Brazil, 
and Chile to see how these factors have affected the decisions of these nations to 
participate in international peacekeeping. That is the subject of the next three chapters. 
















A. INTRODUCTION  
Argentina has been one of the most active nations in the world in the arena of 
international peacekeeping. This dramatic increase in peacekeeping participation was a 
result of Argentina’s successful transition to civilian control over the military, with the 
resulting weakening of military autonomy and prestige. The increase was also affected by 
Argentina’s aggressive internationalist foreign and economic policy in the 1990’s. 
Finally, the shrinking military budget and mission for the Argentine armed forces was a 
third factor affecting Argentina’s peacekeeping involvement. The following chapter will 
analyze Argentina’s status in each of these four areas in order to explain the increase in 
peacekeeping participation in the decade of the 1990’s. Before, analyzing these factors, 
however, the chapter gives a brief overview of Argentina’s recent shift toward being a 
very active participant in international peacekeeping.   
B. PATTERNS OF PEACEKEEPING 
In recent years, Argentina has been the most active nation in peacekeeping 
operations in all of Latin America, and among the most active in the world. However, 
throughout much of its history and well into the 20th century Argentina was not involved 
in many military operations outside its territory. Apart from several wars in the 19th 
century, including its war of independence from Spain, Argentina has largely stayed out 
of global military affairs. In World War I Argentina maintained its neutrality as it did 
again in World War II, while its neighbor Brazil sent troops to Italy to fight on the allied 
side. Only in the latter part of the war, when German defeat looked imminent, did 
Argentina finally declare war on the Axis powers. Finally, in 1982 Argentina fought the 
British over the Malvinas/Falklands Islands. However, this military excursion was 
arguably not outside of Argentine territory. Argentina viewed the islands as sovereign 
territory while Great Britain and the majority of countries outside of Latin America 
recognized them as a British possession. 10 
                                                 
10 Herbert C. Huser, “Democratic Argentina's "Global Reach": The Argentine Military in 
Peacekeeping Operations,” Naval War College Review 51, no. 3 (1998): 55-69. 
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After WWII, under the leadership of Juan Peron, and continuing into the 1980’s 
under other military regimes, Argentina focused its security strategy primarily on internal 
threats from left-wing insurgents. In as much as it did look outside its borders it was 
primarily concerned with protecting its territory from long-time rivals Brazil and Chile. 
Consequently, Argentina’s military involvement in peacekeeping operations during this 
period was minimal. Additionally, Argentina saw itself as a leader within the nonaligned 
movement, currying favor neither with the United States nor with the Soviet Union. This 
nonaligned status further kept it from involvement in peacekeeping operations. 
Nevertheless, Argentina did start providing very small contingents of observers in the 
1950’s to UN operations in Iran-Iraq, and Angola.11 Argentina’s early token involvement 
in UN missions was consistent with its traditional self- image as a regional leader within 
South America. This involvement however remained very small until the Carlos Saul 
Menem administration starting in 1989. 
   Menem’s first opportunity to deploy forces overseas came in 1990 when the 
United Nations requested that Argentina provide patrol boats to support the UN Observer 
Mission in Central America (ONUCA). Argentina responded by sending four of its 
navy’s ships to patrol the Gulf of Fonseca. The next test for Argentina came with the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. While most Latin American countries stayed out of the 
conflict, Argentina stood with the U.S.- led coalition, eventually deploying a destroyer 
and a frigate as well as several air force transport aircraft. With its involvement in 
Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, Argentina became the only Latin 
American nation to join the coalition, immediately gaining favor with the United States.12   
In May 1992, Menem deployed a contingent of about 900 soldiers to make up one 
of the twelve infantry battalions of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). These 
Argentine troops, made up of experienced volunteers, were stationed in Croatia while 
staff officers were sent to UNPROFOR headquarters. This time the deployment 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ricardo E. Lagorio, “Institutionalization, Cooperative Security and Peacekeeping Operations: 
The Argentine Experience,” in International Security & Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in 
the Post-Cold War Era , ed. Jorge I. Dominguez (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 124. 
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demonstrated Menem’s large-scale commitment to participating in UN operations. It 
provided a foundation for what would become perhaps Argentina’s most important 
peacekeeping operation in terms of its world status.   
While Argentine troops were involved in UNPROFOR operations, in 1993 
president Menem announced the deployment of approximately 390 peacekeepers to 
support UN operations in Cyprus. The Argentine military maintained a contingent in 
Cyprus consisting of army, Marine Corps, and air force elements. These troops worked 
side by side with, among others, British troops against whom Argentina had fought a war 
just a decade earlier. An even more significant aspect of this operation than the large 
contingent of Argentines was the announcement in 1997 that Argentine Brigadier 
General Evergisto de Vergara would be commander of the UN force on Cyprus. The 
announcement marked the first time that an Argentine would be in command of a major 
UN operation. 13   
In addition to the above operations, Argentina participated in several other 
peacekeeping operations throughout the 1990’s. The most significant of these were the 
UN missions in Haiti (115 troops), Kuwait (57 military engineers), and Eastern Slavonia 
(73 troops) and Guatemala. Additionally, although not a UN operation, Argentina played 
a key role as a guarantor nation in the Military Observer Mission Ecuador Peru 
(MOMEP).   
Apart from direct participation in peacekeeping operations, a major symbol of 
Argentina’s commitment to global peacekeeping was the establishment of the Argentine 
Joint Peacekeeping Training Center (CAECOPAZ) in Buenos Aires in 1995.14 The 
purpose of CAECOPAZ is to train civilian and military personnel from Argentina and 
other parts of the world to participate in UN operations. As of 2001, representatives from 
                                                 
13 Herbert C. Huser, “Democratic Argentina's "Global Reach": The Argentine Military in 
Peacekeeping Operations,” Naval War College Review 51, no. 3 (1998): 55-69 
14 Antonio L. Pala, “Peacekeeping and its effects on Civil-Military Relations: The Argentine 
Experience” in International Security & Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold 
War Era , ed. Jorge I. Dominguez (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 148-49. 
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fourteen countries in Latin America, Europe, and North America have attended courses at 
CAECOPAZ.15    
In the 1990’s, Argentina went from having relatively little involvement in 
peacekeeping operations to being one of the most active countries in the world in this 
respect. Argentine participation in UN peacekeeping grew from an average of 20 soldiers 
between 1983-89, to 100 in 1991 and3850 in 1993.16 Between 1994 and 1995 Argentina 
contributed about 2 percent of all UN peacekeepers. As this thesis will demonstrate, this 
increase in global participation was no accident and in fact was a direct result of president 
Menem’s internationalist foreign policy. 
C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
Of the three cases analyzed in this thesis, Argentina is the clearest case of a 
military subordinate to civilian control. Since the return of democracy to Argentina in 
1983, the civilian government has wrested policy-making powers away from the armed 
forces. Although some authors still argue that civilian control over the Argentine military 
is not complete,17 most scholars agree that for the most part civilian leaders have control 
over the military. Civil-military relations were an important factor in Argentina’s 
increased involvement in peacekeeping in the 1990’s because civilian control over the 
armed forces made it easier for civilian leaders to shift the military’s mission drastically 
towards increased peacekeeping.       
The current state of civil-military relations in Argentina is a direct result of the 
loss of prestige suffered by the Argentine armed forces after their defeat in the 
Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982, the human rights abuses of the military government in 
the 1970’s and early 1980’s, and the government’s mismanagement of the economy. The 
                                                 
15United Nations Homepage available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training/argentina.htm 
Internet; accessed 11 June 2001. 
16 Jack Child, “Guns and Roses,” Hemisphere Magazine, Vol. 6, no. 3 [on-line]; available from 
http://lacc.fiu.edu/hemisphere/vol6num3/child.html; Internet; accessed 13 May 2001. 
17 J. Patrice McSherry, “Incomplete Transition: Military Power and Democracy in Argentina” (St. 
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first president of the new democracy, Raúl Alfonsín capitalized on the military’s loss of 
face to strip it of all of its political powers. 
Alfonsín started with a plan to prosecute military members who had committed 
human rights violations in the “dirty war,” carried out by the armed forces during the  
previous military regime. Although this plan eventually ended in several compromises, it 
was an important blow to the impunity that the armed forces had enjoyed in Argentina for 
so long.18 In addition to the strategy to pursue human rights abusers, Alfonsín introduced 
numerous reforms to reduce the military’s autonomy and influence in policy matters. The 
military budget, defense industries, and defense policy, were all removed from under the 
direct control of the military and were placed under the oversight  of a civilian- led 
Ministry of Defense.19 Probably the most important reform with repercussions for 
Argentina’s role in international peacekeeping was the 1988 National Defense Law, 
which effectively removed the military from having a significant internal role. By 
stripping the military of an internal role, this legislation opened the way for Argentina’s 
increased role in peacekeeping operations in the 1990’s. In the end, Alfonsín was able to 
strip the military of many of its traditional prerogatives, however his drastic measures led 
to a military backlash that was manifested in several small uprisings. Not until the 
subsequent Menem administration were civil-military relations in Argentina more 
stabilized.  
President Menem sought to reincorporate the military into society and to give the 
armed forces a viable role in the new democracy. The major role that Menem gave the 
military was that of peacekeeping which not only provided the Argentine armed forces 
with a reason for being, but also served to further his foreign policy objectives. Menem’s 
foreign policy and the use of peacekeeping in this policy are the subjects of the 
subsequent sections.   
                                                 
18 David Pion-Berlin and Craig Arceneaux, “Tipping the Civil-Military Balance: Institutions and 
Human Rights Policy in Democratic Argentina and Chile,” Comparative Political Studies,  (Beverly Hills, 
CA: Oct 1998), 633-661. 
19 Wendy Hunter, State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the military’s role in Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996). 
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D. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PREFERENCES 
During the Alfonsín presidency and into the Menem administration, the military 
was stripped of its autonomy in Argentina and further saw a reprioritization of its 
missions, to include peacekeeping. During this time of civil-military reforms the civilian 
leadership, led by president Menem, promoted the use of the military in peacekeeping 
roles. Largely due to their success in controlling the military and reducing its autonomy, 
Argentine civilian leaders were able to effectively use the military in an increased 
peacekeeping capacity. 
For its part, the military entered the early 1990’s, when most peacekeeping 
missions occurred, in a state of disrepair financially and in terms of readiness and morale. 
Rather than looking at peacekeeping as an imposition on their traditional military roles, 
the Argentine armed forces saw the new mission as an opportunity to regain its lost 
prestige, in addition to increasing funding and training opportunities. As the following 
sections will demonstrate, both the Argentine civilian leadership, as well as the military 
saw peacekeeping as beneficial to their interests.    
E. FOREIGN POLICY 
As discussed above, Argentina has only recently taken a large role in 
peacekeeping operations. Specifically with the election of president Menem, Argentina 
has taken on an increasingly internationalist foreign policy, to include more active 
participation in peacekeeping operations as a fundamental part of this policy. Menem 
used Argentina’s military forces to gain favor with the Western world, particularly with 
the United States. The ultimate goal was to improve Argentina’s image, not only to 
garner support from foreign governments but to attract foreign investment as well. As the 
rationale goes, if Argentina is seen as one of the “advanced countries” then investors 
would see the country as a good investment risk.             
As far as president Menem’s foreign policy, one of his major objectives was 
“increased participation in peacekeeping activities and projecting the image of a reliable 
international partner.”20 More than any other country, this effort was directed at gaining 
                                                 
20 Jose C. d’Odorico, “Argentina Waiting in the Wings for a Chance to Join NATO,” Armed 
Forces Journal International 130, no. 7 (February 1993): 38. 
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favor with the United States. From the time of Menem’s inauguration, Argentina took a 
strong stand of supporting United States policy and voting with the United States on most 
major issues. This alignment took place at times even when it was unpopular with 
neighboring countries. Throughout the 1990’s, Argentina consistently participated in UN 
operations along side the United States, to include operations in Haiti, a controversial 
intervention in Latin American circles.21 Most recently in 2001, and even in the wake of 
a major economic crisis, Argentina under president Fernando de la Rúa continued to 
support the United States by offering to provide peacekeepers for the operation in 
Afghanistan. 22   
 In the end, the strategy has worked well for Argentina. In recent years, the 
Argentines gained economic, commercial, and political concessions from the United 
States. One example was the granting of surplus OV-1D Mohawk and C-130 aircraft 
from the United States and more importantly, in spite of British objections, the US sale of 
upgraded A4M Skyhawk fighter aircraft.23 Another international milestone came in 1998 
when President Clinton designated Argentina as a major non-NATO ally, making 
Argentina one of only a handful of nations in the world and the first country in La tin 
America to receive this designation. 24 
F. ECONOMIC POLICY 
Argentina’s economic situation has also greatly influenced its foreign policy and 
hence its economic policies in the 1990’s and into the 21st century. President Menem’s 
foreign policy was clearly aimed at improving Argentina’s economic situation, which 
became dismal during the Alfonsín era. The 1980’s saw Argentina experience one of the 
worst periods of inflation, unemployment, and economic stagnation in its roller coaster-
like economic history. While Alfonsín inherited much of the economic problems from the 
                                                 
21 Herbert C. Huser, “Democratic Argentina's "Global Reach": The Argentine Military in 
Peacekeeping Operations,” Naval War College Review 51, no. 3 (1998): 55-69. 
22 Elizabeth G. Book, “Allies Express Support for U.S. War on Terror,” National Defense, 
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23 Ibid. 
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previous military regime, his administration was not successful in lifting Argentina out of 
its economic decline. When Menem was elected in 1989, he proceeded to undertake an 
economic about face for his country, marked by an aggressive neoliberal economic 
program.25 One of the most significant economic reforms of the Menem administration 
was the almost wholesale privatization of Argentine government enterprises to include 
power, gas, and the railways.26 With this privatization came the need to attract greater 
international investment. The foreign investment was needed because Argentina did not 
have the prior economic success enjoyed by Chile or the burgeoning domestic industries 
manifested in Brazil. This led to the increased internationalist foreign policy and 
ultimately the increase in peacekeeping discussed above. Argentina’s economic policy, 
much like its foreign policy, was a major factor in its peacekeeping activities in the 
1990’s.  
G. MILITARY BUDGET AND MISSIONS  
Another factor that influenced Argentina’s increase in peacekeeping operations 
has been the decline of the military budget and the loss of military missions after the 
return to democracy. With the return of democracy to Argentina and the end of the Cold 
War, military budgets have steadily decreased. UN operations have given Argentina a 
clear economic incentive for participating by allowing them to maintain their training and 
readiness levels in the face of a shrinking budget. 
In 1983, military spending in Argentina represented 3.47% of GDP, or 21.4% of 
government spending. By the end of the Alfonsín administration in 1988, military 
spending was down to 2.12% of GDP, or 19.8% of government expenditures.27 The 
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military budget shrunk even more during the Menem administration. By 1994, military 
spending was just 1.74% of GDP, or the equivalent of 11.4% of government spending. 28 
With this major decline in military spending, Argentina, more than any other country 
analyzed in this thesis, saw a major economic incentive to participate in peacekeeping 
operations.  
Peacekeeping benefits the Argentine military economically at the institutional as 
well as the individual level. As an institution, the Argentine military receives payments 
from the UN for their contributions to peacekeeping. The use of Argentine personnel and 
equipment is made under a Letter of Assist in which the goods and services needed for 
the operation are procured by the contributing nation but paid for by the UN.29 Besides 
just the  purely financial benefits, the Argentine military has gained valuable experience 
in conducting military operations and working in a multilateral environment. As of 1999, 
25% of all Argentine army officers and non-commissioned officers had some 
international peacekeeping experience.30          
There is also a financial benefit to the individual soldier participating in UN 
operations. As an example, the average supplement for a soldier on UN duty is US$980 
per month and an officer on UN observer duty can make between US$85-$120 per diem. 
Considering the average non-commissioned officer salary in Argentina is US$760, and a 
captain’s salary is around US$1,500, it is no wonder that during the initial deployment to 
UNPROFOR there were many more volunteers than billets available.31 These financial 
incentives have clearly been important in convincing the Argentine military of the merits 
of establishing peacekeeping as a major mission area.  
                                                 
28 Ibid.  
29 Herbert C. Huser, “Democratic Argentina's "Global Reach": The Argentine Military in 
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30 Jack Child, “Guns and Roses,” Hemisphere Magazine, Vol. 6, no. 3 [on-line]; available from 
http://lacc.fiu.edu/hemisphere/vol6num3/child.html; Internet; accessed 13 May 2001. 
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In addition to the financial need imposed by the civilian reforms of the new 
democracy, the loss of military missions has also affected Argentina’s decision to 
participate in peacekeeping. As stated above the National Defense Law of 1988 
effectively removed the Argentine military from the role of internal security. With one of 
their  major missions taken away from them the Argentine armed forces were in need of a 
new reason for being. Although external defense was, and still is, officially the number 
one mission, decreasing border tensions with Brazil and Chile in the 1980’s left the 
military without a viable role. Peacekeeping gave the military an honorable external 
mission and a much needed morale boost. 
H. CONCLUSION 
Argentina’s civil-military relations, foreign policy, and, military status made it an 
ideal candidate for increased involvement in international peacekeeping operations in the 
1990’s. With firm civilian control over the military, president Menem’s plans to increase 
the armed forces’ role in peacekeeping to further his foreign and economic goals was 
successfully carried out. On the part of the military, besides not having the necessary 
autonomy to resist the imposition of new roles and mission, it saw peacekeeping as a way 




Brazil has traditionally held a view of itself as a regional, as well as a world 
leader. Accordingly, Brazil long ago developed an elite diplomatic corps. In addition, 
Brazil strives for positions of international leadership, particularly in the UN. This desire 
to lead also manifests itself in its peacekeeping record. The following chapter will 
demonstrate how Brazilian foreign policy objectives have been the major factors 
affecting its participation in international peacekeeping. Additionally, it will explain how 
economic policy, and military budgets and missions have provided few incentives for 
Brazilian participation in PKOs. Compared to Argentina and Chile, Brazil has maintained 
a consistent and medium level presence in PKOs, consistent with their image as leaders 
in the international arena. As with the chapter on Argentina, this chapter begins with an 
overview of Brazilian peacekeeping activities.    
B. PATTERNS OF PEACEKEEPING  
Brazil has a long history in UN peacekeeping operations dating back to the 
1940’s. As a founding member of the UN, Brazil took an active role in the organization’s 
operations from the very beginning. In 1947, Brazil sent observers to Greece as part of a 
UN contingent during the Greek civil war. In 1956 Brazil was one of ten countries to 
make up the first UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) in the Gaza Strip. From 1956 until the 
end of the operation in 1967, Brazil contributed over 6,000 troops to UNEF I. The next 
Brazilian contribution came shortly after in 1958 when it sent an air force contingent as 
part of the UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL). In 1960 when violence broke 
out in the Congo in wake of that country’s independence from Belgium, a group of 
Brazilian air force pilots deployed to support the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC). 
Brazilian troops maintained a presence there until the end of the operation in 1964.   
Besides taking part in UN-sponsored operations, Brazil was also active in its own 
region. In 1965, it sent troops in support of the OAS-sponsored Inter-American Peace 
Force (FIM), established to maintain order and peace in the Dominican Republic. Brazil 
sent an infantry battalion totaling 3,000 personnel from 1965 until 1966. In addition to 
the infantry troops, Brazil provided two generals as commanders of the FIM and provided 
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logistical support with its navy and air force. Between 1962 and 1965 Brazil took part in 
several smaller UN operations in New Guinea, Pakistan, and Cyprus.32 
More recently, Brazil has participated in many peacekeeping operations in Latin 
America and throughout the world. Among the most notable in recent years have been its 
deployments to UNAVEM I, II, and III, in Angola; UNPROFOR in the Former 
Yugoslavia; ONUMOZ in Mozambique; MOMEP at the Ecuador-Peru border; and 
UNTAET in East Timor. In all of the preceding operations, Brazil provided either a 
general officer as operational commander, or in the case of UNTAET, a Civilian 
Representative of the Secretary-General and Transitional Administrator.33 
C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
Unlike Argentina, the current state of civil-military relations in Brazil is less clear. 
There are at least two schools of thought on the matter of Brazilian civil-military 
relations. Some scholars like Wendy Hunter believe that since the end of military rule in 
1985 there has been a clear decline in military prerogatives. According to Hunter 
“democratically elected politicians have successfully contested the military over a broad 
range of issues and narrowed its sphere of political influence.”34 Her argument is based 
on the belief that elected politicians have a vested interest in diminishing military 
influence in politics in order to further their own political aspirations, and according to 
Hunter, the civilian politicians have been successful in doing this. 
An opposing view is held by Jorge Zaverucha who views military influence in 
Brazil as very strong in spite of democratic reforms, particularly due to the prerogatives 
that the armed forces are guaranteed in the 1988 constitution. Article 142 of the Brazilian 
constitution defines the military as the “guardian of constitutional powers, of the law, and 
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of public order.”35 Zaverucha also points to the continued role of the military in internal 
roles such as domestic intelligence and police operations as evidence of their continued 
influence.       
 The actual state of civil-military relations and specifically of military prerogatives 
and influence is probably somewhere in between the two views. The creation of a civilian 
ministry of defense in 1999 by president Fernando Henrique Cardoso surely appears to be 
another step towards diminishing military influence and would lend credence to Hunter’s 
argument. However, according to Joao Martins Filho and Daniel Zirker the military has 
purposely given in to certain reforms such as the new ministry of defense in order to 
achieve victories in other areas. By the same token although Cardoso successfully 
instituted the civilian defense minister as a permanent part of his cabinet, he has appeased 
the military by supporting salary increases (in spite of budget cuts in other sectors of 
government, promising military modernization, and allowing the military to continue its 
Amazonian development project.36 In reviewing the evidence, it becomes clear that civil-
military relations in Brazil vary according to issue area. Thus, it is necessary to examine 
the role of civilians and the military in foreign policy decision-making, the sphere most 
relevant for peacekeeping.   
Most scholars generally agree that since the return of democracy in 1985, the 
Brazilian foreign ministry, known as Itamaraty, has taken over as the major player in 
foreign policy matters. However depending on the subject matter other agencies may take 
the lead in making foreign policy decisions. For example, the economic ministry often 
makes policy regarding trade matters. Similarly, the military has maintained at least some 
influence in defense matters, particularly in peacekeeping. In 1991, when the UN 
requested Brazilian troops for a peacekeeping operation in Namibia, the foreign ministry 
agreed but the army was able to overturn the decision. However, the opposite occurred in 
1995 when the military approved the deployment of troops to Angola and the finance and 
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planning ministries delayed the action for economic reasons.37 With respect to 
peacekeeping, it appears that although civilian leaders make policy decisions in Brazil, 
the military still has some capacity to veto those decisions. 
D. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PREFERENCES 
Brazilian civilian leaders view peacekeeping as but one component in the overall 
goal of ascending to world power status. In the same way as Brazil volunteers to fill 
important positions in the UN civilian structure, including the Security Council, it has 
traditionally participated in peacekeeping to show that it does its fa ir share of the work on 
the military side. In addition, Brazil has preferred filling key positions of leadership in 
peacekeeping operations rather than sending large numbers of troops. Brazilian civilian 
decision makers, therefore, see a medium level of participation in peacekeeping as the 
most appropriate role for Brazil. 
 As far as the military leadership in Brazil, they too see a medium role as the best 
for their interests. Participation of high-ranking Brazilian officers in peacekeeping 
operations lends a degree of prestige to the military establishment. Along with its 
participation with the Allies in World War II,38 the Brazilian military sees a limited 
amount of peacekeeping participation as a benefit to its international image. Unlike 
Argentina, however, it does not need to increase its role in peacekeeping because it has 
sufficient legitimate internal missions to justify its existence. The remainder of the 
chapter will provide more in depth analysis of how these civilian and military preferences 
are manifested in Brazil. 
E. FOREIGN POLICY 
In 1908, during a conference at Yale University, Brazil’s first ambassador to the 
United States, Joaquim Nabuco said, “Brazil has always been conscious of its size and 
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has been governed by a prophetic sentiment with regard to its future."39 This “prophetic 
sentiment” continues to drive Brazilian foreign policy in the 21st century. Due to its 
continental proportions and vast resources, Brazil aspires to be a world leader, politically 
and economically. In addition, due to its size and resources, it holds on strongly to the 
principles of national sovereignty and non- intervention. Its aspirations to world 
leadership and protection of its sovereignty are recurring themes in Brazilian foreign and 
defense policy, to include peacekeeping policy. 
Two trends predominate in Brazilian foreign policy. First, since the 1990’s Brazil 
has been more likely than Argentina to maintain a foreign policy independent of the 
United States.40 This stems from the fact that Brazil feels strongly about the principle of 
non- intervention, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, and values the importance of 
national sovereignty over internationalization. Argentina on the other hand appears to 
have given up its past aspirations for world power status and has settled for a share of the 
power in South America.  
A second characteristic of Brazilian foreign policy has been its tendency to seek 
out positions of leadership in international politics, primarily through international 
organizations such as the United Nations in order to achieve its world power status. 
Brazil has done this mainly through its highly professional diplomatic corps in the 
foreign ministry. In line with its foreign policy, a characteristic of Brazil’s peacekeeping 
policy has been its proclivity to participate in operations in countries that it believes to be 
within its sphere of influence, where it can exert a leadership role. In most cases, Brazil 
considers former Portuguese colonies, with which it shares a cultural and linguistic bond, 
to be in its sphere of influence. Accordingly, Brazil has been most active and arguably 
most effective in fellow former Portuguese colonies such as Angola, Mozambique, and 
most recently East Timor. Brazil has not, however, been as persuaded by mere regional 
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proximity, particularly where the United States has the leadership role, as evidenced by 
their virtual lack of involvement in the peacekeeping operation in Haiti.   
1. Non-intervention  
Brazil maintains a foreign policy based on national sovereignty and non-
intervention in the Western Hemisphere. As a result, Brazil has been reluctant to enter 
into any agreements based on collective intervention. 41 Brazil’s non- interventionist 
foreign policy stems from its own hegemonic aspirations and a fear that supporting 
interventionism in the Western Hemisphere may some day result in US involvement in 
the Brazilian Amazon. 42 Today one of Brazil’s major strategic priorities is the 
development and defense of the Amazon basin, primarily through the military project 
known as “Calha Norte”43 Accordingly, nationalism is still a strong force in the Brazilian 
military and there is a distrust of US military expansion in Latin America, and 
particularly in the Amazon region. While this has not completely kept Brazil out of 
participating in multilateral peacekeeping, it has ensured that it remains selective in the 
types of operations that it supports. At the same time Brazilian foreign policy has 
involved a sensitive balancing act between staying independent in its actions and 
maintaining good relations with the US, who after all is still the major superpower in the 
region and the world, and is an important ally for Brazil economically and militarily. An 
example of Brazil’s solidarity with the US was its call to invoke the Rio Treaty (the  
Western Hemisphere defense pact) after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the 
United States. However, Brazil, more than any country in the Hemisphere (with the 
exception of Cuba) occasionally professes a foreign policy position at odds with the 
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United States. An example of this was Brazil’s position on the US-led intervention in 
Haiti. 
When a military coup overthrew Haitian president Jean Bertrand Aristide in 
September 1991, the Organization of American States (OAS), with the support of the 
United States, imposed an embargo on the military junta.44 After 18 months of ineffective 
sanctions however, the OAS urged the UN Security Council (UNSC) to strengthen the 
embargo. Among the few OAS members to oppose UNSC involvement in Haiti was 
Brazil. Although it failed in keeping the UNSC out of the situation, Brazil successfully 
convinced fellow OAS members to drop a proposal to impose a naval blockade of 
Haiti.45 Later in 1994 when the UNSC adopted a resolution to use force in Haiti, Brazil 
was one of only two abstentions (China being the other) with 12 votes in favor of using 
force. Coincidentally, many other Latin American countries that were not on the Security 
Council also did not favor the use of force in Haiti. This episode clearly demonstrated 
Brazil taking a stand against US foreign policy and opting not to partake in a 
peacekeeping intervention in its own hemisphere, which it deemed to be a violation of 
sovereignty. By contrast, Argentina supported the use of force in Haiti.46 
2. World Power Aspirations  
The other important characteristic in Brazil’s foreign policy has been its tendency 
to express its desire to be a world power by seeking positions of leadership in world 
politics, particularly within the United Nations. A prime example of this is its stated goal 
of achieving a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), when and 
if this body expands its membership. Brazil has traditionally been a supporter of 
international organizations and was a founding member of the League of Nations in 1920 
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and the UN in 1945.47 In addition, it has chaired the UNSC on various occasions, most 
recently in 1999. Like other nations of medium power, such as Sweden or Canada, Brazil 
has used international organizations as a way to exercise its influence and counterbalance 
that of the superpowers. In order to support its international diplomatic endeavors, Brazil 
relies on a highly competent and professional foreign service. Potential Brazilian foreign 
service personnel are selectively recruited, and put through a rigorous academic training 
program, resulting in highly skilled diplomats and negotiators.48  
In accordance with its foreign policy, Brazil’s peacekeeping policy has also 
showed an affinity to become involved in UN operations where it can hold positions of 
leadership, particularly in countries that it considers within its sphere of influence. 
Specifically Brazil has been heavily involved in countries that like itself are former 
colonies of Portugal, specifically Angola, Mozambique and East Timor.  
By taking part in peacekeeping in these countries, Brazil sees the opportunity to 
fill a leadership void in the Portuguese-speaking world. This view is supported by Brazil 
experts like Monica Hirst, executive director of the Center of Brazilian Studies in 
Argent ina, who claims, “the presence of Brazilian officers has become...important in 
Portuguese-speaking African countries...where cultural and linguistic familiarity together 
with a previous diplomatic presence have been relevant incentives.”49 Brazil has even 
gone so far as to propose the formation of a peacekeeping force comprised of the seven 
members of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), predictably with 
Brazil playing a key leadership role.50    
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In 1994, Brazil deployed a force of 264 troops to ONUMOZ in Mozambique. 
This deployment was the largest deployment of Brazilian combat troops since the 1965 
intervention in the Dominican Republic. Brazil eventually increased its contingent in 
Mozambique to 1,200 troops, making them one of the major contributors to the operation. 
They also provided a general officer as chief military observer to the mission. 51 Similarly 
between 1988 and 1997 Brazil supported UNAVEM I, II, and III in Angola with over 
1,200 troops, including several general officers as operational commanders.52 More 
recently, Brazil was one of the first countries to lend support to the Australian- led UN 
intervention in East Timor, (another former Portuguese colony) under the International 
Force in East Timor (INTERFET). Additionally, Brazil was one of the sponsors of the 
UNSC resolution to establish UNTAET. 53 Besides supporting UNTAET with a 
contingent of military police troops, a Brazilian, Sergio Vieira de Mello, was named 
Civilian Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Transitional Administrator 
in East Timor.54 
This dynamic in Brazilian foreign policy illustrates an interesting point for future 
peacekeeping. Brazil tends to focus its attention towards areas where it is less likely to 
compete for leadership with the United States, particularly in its perceived sphere of 
influence. Given this affinity towards striving for positions of leadership in peacekeeping, 
it may be less likely in the future to support a peacekeeping operation in Latin America 
where the US is fully in charge without sharing some of the leadership responsibilities. 
An example of a successful regional peacekeeping operation where the United States and 
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Brazil both participated is the Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru (MOMEP). A 
Brazilian general led this operation. 55     
In reviewing Brazilian foreign policy strategy, it is evident that it has a major 
impact on its peacekeeping policy. In order to defend its own sovereignty, Brazil 
adamantly defends the principle of non-intervention in the Western Hemisphere and is 
reluctant to support peacekeeping operations in the region, even at the expense of coming 
into disagreement with the US. On the other hand, Brazil uses international peacekeeping 
in order to promote its own global leadership aspirations. 
F. ECONOMIC POLICY 
Like its foreign policy, Brazil’s economic policy seeks to increase its power and 
prestige in the global community. In order to improve its status economically, Brazil has 
pursued primarily a regional approach. Brazil’s regional approach to economic success 
has precluded it from using peacekeeping as a way to achieve economic goals, in the way 
that Argentina did. Instead, it has relied on a regional approach in which it sees itself as 
the economic leader in South America and its large domestic market to attract foreign 
investors. 
 With the establishment of the Southern Cone Common Market 
(Mercosur/Mercosul), Brazil became the dominant partner in one of the world’s major 
economic integration projects.56 Mercosur has allowed Brazil to maintain comparative 
advantage in many of its domestic industries, that otherwise might not compete favorably 
if opened to the global economy. Brazil views these domestic industries, especially 
automobiles and information systems as a symbol of their world leadership status. 
Although Brazil supports the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), as stated by 
foreign minister Celso Lafer, “Mercosul is our destiny, while the FTAA is an option.”57 
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As far as foreign investment, Brazil’s population of roughly 175,00058 is in itself 
an attractive feature for outside investors. In sum, with its regional economic plan, 
domestic industries, and large consumer market, Brazil has not needed peacekeeping as a 
way to improve its economy. The following section explores the impact of military 
budget and missions on Brazil’s peacekeeping ventures. 
G. MILITARY BUDGET AND MISSIONS 
While Brazil’s foreign policy has been a major influence on its peacekeeping 
activities, military resources have been less of an influence. Brazil’s armed forces have 
suffered less from budget cuts and loss of missions than have Argentina’s and therefore 
have seen less of a need to supplement these with peacekeeping operations. In addition, 
the Brazilian military has maintained a large number of internal missions, especially the 
expanding mission in the Amazon region. This “job security” has precluded the military 
from needing to increase its peacekeeping involvement.  
The Brazilian military went through several stages of budget cuts since the end of 
the military government in 1985. The first democratically elected president José Sarney 
(1985-1990), did little to alter the military’s budget since at this time the military still 
held a great deal of influence after the pacted transition to democracy. 59 Not until the 
reformist Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-1992) became president was the military 
budget affected dramatically. Collor aggressively attacked military prerogatives including 
slashing the budget. However, his impeachment in 1992 cut short his presidency, and 
slowed the momentum of his military reform policies.60 His vice president and successor, 
Itamar Franco (1992-1994) lacked the political influence to carry out Collor’s reforms, 
such as military restructuring.  
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As it turned out, any prospects for major military budget cuts perished with the 
impeachment of Collor. In 1994, Finance Minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso took the 
reins of the presidency and made economic development the number one priority of his 
administration. At the same time he played a delicate balancing game with the military, 
attempting to exert civilian control (culminating in the creation of the civilian- led 
Ministry of Defense) while appeasing the military financially. This financial appeasement 
came largely in the form of a constitutional amendment proposed by Cardoso in 1996 that 
prevented military salaries from being cut, as was called for by the economic austerity 
measures of the Real Plan of 1994.61 In the end, military salaries were not only saved 
from the budget axe, but in fact were increased. Other aspects of the defense budget also 
received boosts during this period including a modernization plan for all branches of the 
armed forces. 
Much like the budget, military missions in Brazil have remained relatively 
constant since the 1980’s. Again, this is an area where Brazil and Argentina differ. In 
Brazil, many of the traditional internal roles carried out by the military are still a part of 
their mandate. Internal security and civic action projects are still accepted by the military 
and the public as legitimate military roles. The sweeps of the crime and drug infested 
favelas (slums) by military units throughout the 1990’s and the more recent replacement 
of striking police in Salvador, Bahía, with military troops are just two examples of how 
the armed forces maintain a strong internal security role.62 In addition to the internal 
roles, the defense of the Amazon basin gives the Brazilian military a major external 
defense role as well. Neither the military budget nor military missions changed 
drastically in Brazil after 1985. As a result, neither of these factors provided incentives 
for civilians or the military to advocate increased participation in peacekeeping. 
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H. CONCLUSION 
Brazil’s peacekeeping participation has been affected primarily by its foreign 
policy strategy. Brazil seeks a role as world leader and uses peacekeeping as a secondary 
method to civilian diplomacy as a way to achieve its goals. Its economic policy, although 
also ultimately aimed at attaining world status, is more focused on a regional strategy and 
is therefore not as reliant on international peacekeeping. Finally, Brazil’s military budget 
and its roles and missions have survived the end of the Cold War relatively unchanged 



















Chile’s military has seen relatively little action in the sphere of international 
peacekeeping. Although it has participated since 1949 in UN operations, its contributions 
have always been minimal in terms of personnel, even in the post-Cold War era of 
increased peacekeeping. The main impetus for Chile’s lack of participation in 
peacekeeping in the period following the Pinochet dictatorship is the high level of 
autonomy maintained by its armed forces. Additionally the strategic doctrine of 
traditional territorial defense that has persisted in the military has kept Chile out of new 
mission areas for the most part. Finally, the robust budget and secure role of the military 
in Chile has obviated the need to increase its participation in peacekeeping missions. 
B. PATTERNS OF PEACEKEEPING  
Compared to its Southern Cone neighbors Chile has had relatively little 
experience in peacekeeping operations.63 Chile’s first experience in UN peacekeeping 
came in 1949 with the UN Military Observer Group in Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Since 
1949 Chile has continued to send small groups of officers to UNMOGIP and over the 
years, the Chilean contribution has reached over 100 personnel. Chile’s next operational 
involvement in UN peacekeeping came in 1967 when it sent its first observers to support 
the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East. Chile has 
consistently sent two officers per year to UNTSO. In 1969 under the purview of the OAS, 
Chile sent two officers to support the observer mission to monitor the cease-fire between 
El Salvador and Honduras after a border conflict flared up between the two countries.64 
Twenty-four years passed before Chile was to see another peacekeeping operation. In 
1991, Chile provided a helicopter to support the UN-imposed buffer zone in Iraq and 
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Kuwait (UNIKOM).65 This was followed by participation in ONUSAL in El Salvador in 
1992, UNTAC in Cambodia in 1992-93, and OAS-sponsored demining efforts in 1993.66 
In all these cases, Chilean involvement was limited to several officers per operation. With 
the outbreak of the border conflict between Peru and Ecuador in 1995, Chile found itself 
sending observers, as one of the four guarantor na tions under the Rio Protocol (the US, 
Brazil, and Argentina being the others) to oversee the cease-fire. This operation lasted 
from 1995 until 1999. In 1996, Chile took part in the UN Special Commission in Iraq 
(UNSCOM) and in 1997, several Chilean officers were deployed in support of UNMIBH 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The most recent deployment of Chilean troops in a peacekeeping 
operation came in 2000 when it sent a contingent of 34 troops (large by Chilean 
standards) to East Timor in support of UNTAET. 67    
In cases where Chile takes part in peacekeeping, it uses very specific criteria for 
involvement as outlined in its foreign and security policies. In recent years, the UN and 
the United States have put more pressure on Chile to take on a larger role in 
peacekeeping operations. In spite of this pressure, Chile has continued to send only small 
numbers of personnel, primarily in the role of observers. On some occasions it has even 
rejected requests for troops from the UN and has resisted the idea of establishing a rapid 
reaction force for peacekeeping operations such as exists in other countries.68 
According to the Chilean Permanent Mission to the United Nations, explicit 
criteria are used to decide upon its participation in peacekeeping operations. Among these 
is the specific stipulation that Chile will only participate in a mission where “the parties 
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involved in the conflict have previously required the intervention of peace forces.”69 In 
other words, Chile generally will only take part in UN missions under Chapter 6 of the 
UN Charter (peacekeeping) and will not become involved in Chapter 7 missions, which 
entail peace enforcement with or without the consent of the warring parties.70 These strict 
rules for peacekeeping participation may simply be a result of a non- interventionist 
foreign policy, similar to Brazil’s. However, this policy also ensures that the Chilean 
military’s contributions to peacekeeping will stay at a low level. 
C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS  
Of the three cases studied in this thesis, Chile’s armed forces are generally 
considered as having the greatest autonomy vis-à-vis their civilian leaders. According to 
Claudio Fuentes, since the return of democracy in Chile, institutions and political culture 
have both encouraged the continued autonomy of the military. 71 Gregory Weeks further 
illustrates the ability of Chile’s military to circumvent civilian institutions in order to 
achieve their goals.72 
   The Constitution of 1980, carried over from the Pinochet era, guarantees Chile's 
military autonomy. The constitution gives the armed forces specific political powers, 
particularly the guarantee of having four designated members of the senate, who are 
chosen from among the former commanders of each of the armed forces.73 Possibly more 
important to the military’s autonomy than the senatorial appointments, are the 
constitutional guarantees regarding the military budget. The first guarantee ensures that 
military funding cannot fall below 1989 military expenditure levels in real terms. Second, 
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the military is guaranteed 10 per cent of export profits from Chile’s nationalized copper 
industry.74 These constitutional privileges give the military in Chile enough autonomy to 
influence decision making in the defense arena, including military roles and missions.           
Chilean military autonomy has allowed the armed forces to maintain the 
traditional military mission of external defense as its main role. Unlike Argentina, where 
the military lost most of its autonomy after the re-establishment of democracy, Chile’s 
military was not forced into adopting peacekeeping as a major role.  
In spite of having the second largest military in the Southern Cone with about 
102,000 personnel, (compared to 65,000 for Argentina), Chile has chosen not to become 
extensively involved in peacekeeping operations.75 The primary reason for not being as 
involved in peacekeeping operations as its Southern Cone neighbors is that Chile’s 
military still holds on to a great degree of autonomy in policy making vis-à-vis the 
civilian policymakers and it does not see extensive involvement in peacekeeping as being 
in its best interest. Additionally, Chile continues to subscribe to a traditional national 
security policy focused towards defending its borders from foreign aggression. 76 Chile 
sees conventional defense as the number one mission of its military and it views external 
peacekeeping as only a minor role. However, Chile has not been completely absent from 
global peacekeeping. Not withstanding its contributions have been minimal in terms of 
personnel and are made mostly to avoid a negative international image.  
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D. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PREFERENCES 
In the “Book of the National Defense of Chile,” published by the civilian- led 
Ministry of Defense, the Chilean government clearly explains its strict criteria for 
participation in international peacekeeping missions.77 These strict criteria presented by 
Chile’s civilian leadership, and their resistance to pressure from the United States to 
increase Chilean participation in peacekeeping give the impression that civilians do not 
desire an expanded role in peacekeeping for the military.  
However, civilian leaders in Chile have professed their commitment to 
peacekeeping. In May 2000, the Chilean defense ministry hosted an international 
peacekeeping seminar. According to then defense minister María Soledad Alvear, the 
purpose of the seminar was to reiterate Chile’s commitment to UN peacekeeping. 78 
Similarly, Chile announced plans to open a peacekeeping training center similar to 
Argentina’s CAECOPAZ. 79 Finally, according to Chile’s Permanent Mission to the UN, 
the country will increase its participation in peacekeeping. However, in spite of these 
statements, as of June 2001, Chile had 50 peacekeepers deployed around the world 
(compared to 658 from Argentina).80 Additionally, as will be discussed in the sections on 
military budget and missions, Chile continues to maintain a defense policy aimed at 
conventional defense. There appears to be an inconsistency between civilian leaders’ 
statements and Chile’s actions regarding peacekeeping. There are at least two 
possibilities to account for these inconsistencies. It could be that Chile’s civilian decision 
makers do not really want to make a major commitment to peacekeeping and they are just 
be paying lip service to the international community in order to maintain a good image. 
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On the other hand, the military may still hold enough influence to keep civilians from 
implementing major changes in their roles and mission. I propose that the second 
possibility is true. Military preferences regarding peacekeeping appear to have more 
influence in Chile’s policy for peacekeeping.    
    Military preferences regarding peacekeeping are quite clear. Given the 
military’s self image as the protector of the Chilean republic, and its commitment to 
traditiona l territorial defense, peacekeeping is not viewed as a desirable or necessary 
mission by the military. On the other hand, the military has participated in small numbers 
in peacekeeping operations, as well as multinational peacekeeping exercises. While the 
Chilean military values maintaining a positive international image, and will take part in 
multilateral operations to preserve this image, it is not willing to compromise its primary 
mission of territorial defense. 
E. FOREIGN POLICY 
Chile’s foreign policy goals in the 1990’s have not served as an impetus for 
increasing its level of participation in peacekeeping. The major goal of its foreign policy 
after the Pinochet era was to reinsert Chile into the international diplomatic arena and to 
resolve existing border disputes with neighboring countries. To achieve both of these 
goals, Chile relied on its well-respected civilian diplomatic corps. The following section 
describes Chile’s foreign policy in the post-Pinochet era and explains why peacekeeping 
was not necessary to achieve its goals in this arena.        
Chile’s diplomatic service has historically been well respected around the world 
largely due to the traditional prestige of Chile’s democratic institutions. Although the 
Pinochet era resulted in a set back in its democratic institutions, the return of democracy 
has thrust Chile back into the international arena. Bolstered by its strong political ties to 
European Christian Democratic and Socialist parties and its strong economic 
performance, Chile enjoys international influence beyond its size.81    
Unlike Argentina’s post-authoritarian foreign policy strategy of aggressive 
insertion into the international arena (international peacekeeping was one part of this 
strategy), since the end of the Pinochet era Chile has taken a more gradual approach to 
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internationalization. Somewhat like Brazil, Chile has been selective about its alignment 
posture with the U.S. As a result, peacekeeping has not played a major role in foreign 
policy.   
Traditionally, Chile’s foreign and defense policy has been based on the defense of 
its borders from foreign aggression, especially from its traditional rivals Argentina and 
Peru. This distrust of its neighbors is due in part to its geographic position. Chile is a long 
nation (over 5,000 kilometers from north to south), but a very narrow nation (only 200 
kilometers average width).82 With no nation to act as a buffer between itself and 
Argentina, these geographical realities over the years have engendered a “siege 
mentality.” Although, Chile has not gone to war with one of its neighbors in over a 
century, as recently as 1978 it almost went to war with Argentina over the Beagle 
Channel.83  
However, since the end of the Pinochet era Chile has taken strides to resolve its 
border issues with its neighbors. Starting with a border agreement with Argentina in 1991 
Chile has made the resolution of historic disputes with its neighbors one of its primary 
foreign policy goals. During the 1990’s, Chile also made great strides in its relationship 
with Peru, although as of the end of the decade this process was still ongoing.84 In spite 
of this resolution of border disputes, Chilean defense policy continues to stress traditional 
defense. A recent example is its purchase of F-16 fighters for its air force.85 This seems 
to be at odds with its foreign policy and can likely be explained by the continued 
influence of the military in defense matters.    
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Neither diplomatic reinsertion nor the resolution of border disputes required 
increased participation in peacekeeping for Chile. Instead, it relied on traditional civilian 
diplomatic means to achieve their goals. In the end, Chilean foreign policy has not need 
to stress international peacekeeping as a major part of its overall efforts. 
F. ECONOMIC POLICY 
Chile’s economic policy benefits from its traditional diplomatic prestige and is 
bolstered by its successful economic performance. Spearheaded by a multilateral 
economic integration strategy, Chile’s economic policy has obviated the need for large-
scale proactive participation in international peacekeeping as a way to enter the 
international system, in the way that Argentina has. Particularly the fact that Chile was 
not economically beholden to any one nation or region allowed them to carry out a more 
independent foreign policy, unlike Argentina which felt more dependent on gaining favor 
with the United States for its international status.  
The main priority of Chile’s economic policy during the since the Pinochet era 
has been international reinsertion through economic means. In the case of Chile, this 
meant not putting all its economic hopes in one particular region but to undertake a 
strategy of economic integration with many different partners. Geographically Chile is 
part of South America, but due to its long Pacific coastline, it is also a part of the Pacific 
Basin. This fact has not been lost on Chilean decision makers who have opened up their 
economy as much to Asian nations, as to nations of the Western Hemisphere. It is 
important to note that this multilateral approach to trade began in the 1970’s during the 
Pinochet era, even though formal membership in trade organizations occurred in the 
1990’s. 
The first step in Chile’s international economic integration process actually 
happened with Asia as Japan replaced the United States as Chile’s largest customer by 
1991 and Chile became a member of the Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 
November 1994.86 Then, in 1996 Chile became an associate member of the Southern 
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Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR). In that same year, they reached a framework 
agreement for economic matters with the European Union. Additionally, not to leave out 
the world’s largest economy from their economic strategy, in the early 1990’s Chile 
began negotiations with the United States, Canada, and Mexico for membership in the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). However, plans for NAFTA 
membership were indefinitely placed on hold when President Clinton was unable to 
obtain “fast-track” negotiation authority from the U.S. Congress.87 
G. MILITARY BUDGET AND MISSIONS 
As noted above, the Chilean military enjoys a great degree of economic autonomy 
as a result of its constitutional guarantees: the military budget can not fall to below 1989 
levels and it is guaranteed 10 per cent of copper exports. Although the importance of 
these prerogatives may be minimized with time, for now they continue to give the 
military a buffer from excessive civilian intrusion in defense matters. Some authors argue 
that this is not the case. Wendy Hunter claims that the decline of the defense budget 
relative to GDP since the end of the Pinochet era (2.96% of GDP in 1989 to 1.65% of 
GDP in 1996) is an indication of civilian contestation of military prerogatives.88 
However, the decline of the budget relative to GDP is misleading, and is more a result of 
Chile’s successful economic performance than civilian contestation. In fact, in absolute 
terms, the budget has increased from US$1.047 million in 1989 to US1.220 million in 
1997.89 With its continued economic autonomy, the Chilean military has not seen itself 
pressured to participate in international peacekeeping as a way to bolster its budget.   
In terms of military roles and missions, the military has focused on traditional 
defense of its borders from external aggression. The military’s training and 
modernization effort continues to move in this direction. In addition to external defense, 
the military also plays a secondary role in internal development. 
                                                 
87 Ibid. 45. 
88 Wendy Hunter, "Continuity or Change? Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Argentina, 
Chile, and Peru,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 112, Nr. 3 (1997), pp. 453-475. 
89 Ruth Stanley, “Modes of Transition v. Electoral Dynamics: Democratic Control of the Military 
in Argentina and Chile,” Journal of Third World Studies, (Americus, Fall 2001) pp. 71-91 
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As noted above, in spite of a decrease in border tensions since the end of the Cold  
War and the overall lack of external security threats, the Chilean military has held on to a 
policy emphasizing the defense of the nation from external aggression. The best example 
of how Chile continues to focus on traditional threats is its military modernization plan. 
Each service has a plan to modernize that includes almost exclusively modern military 
hardware. According to Chile’s defense minister, Mario Fernandez, Chile needs to be 
prepared for international peacekeeping, fisheries protection, and drug trafficking, 
however Chile’s modernization plans do not match this statement.90 The air force will be 
receiving new F-16 fighters from the United States, the navy plans to purchase four 
German frigates, and the army’s modernization plans focus on improving their electronic 
warfare capabilities, specifically anti-air and anti-armor defense. Accordingly, training 
continues to follow traditional roles, as evidenced by the curriculum at the Centro de 
Entrenamiento Operativo y Táctico, the army’s new training center.91 
Although the military has emphasized external defense roles, there is a tradition in 
Chile of an internal development role for the armed forces, and this role is growing 
slightly. Although not as large as Brazil’s project in the Amazons, the Chilean military 
has pursued a project called Fronteras Interiores (Interior Borders), focused on territorial 
occupation of the extreme north, south and east and the national integration and economic 
modernization of these otherwise desolate territories.92  
Peacekeeping then holds only a minor role for the Chilean military. As evidenced 
by its aggressive modernization plan, even against public opinion and the wishes of many 
politicians, Chile’s military continues to have a large say in their roles and missions 93. 
Unlike Argentina, they have not been forced into accepting peacekeeping as a major role 
for the military.        
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Of the three nations in this study, the Chilean military has maintained the highest 
degree of autonomy in the democratic era. In addition, the Chilean armed forces have 
held on to the traditional doctrine of territorial defense. As a result the Chilean military 
was relatively absent from most UN military operations during the 1990’s. While it 
appears that even Chilean civilian leadership is reluctant to become greatly involved in 
peacekeeping missions, it appears that it is the military’s influence that is the greatest 
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V. REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING: CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Thus far, the analysis has shown that each country in this study has demonstrated 
a different pattern concerning international peacekeeping. Argentina participates 
extensively in international peacekeeping operations. For their part, Brazil operates in 
peacekeeping missions at a moderately high level, though less than Argentina. Finally, 
Chile’s involvement in international peacekeeping has been relatively low. Given these 
patterns in international peacekeeping, is it safe to assume that these nations would 
follow the same path regarding regional peacekeeping? This chapter reviews the factors 
earlier identified as crucial for regional peacekeeping decisions, namely, operational 
funding, the presence of a regional hegemon, and the higher stakes involved in regional 
versus international peacekeeping.   
A. OPERATIONAL FUNDING  
One of the main critiques of regional peacekeeping is the general lack of 
operational capability of regional organization to conduct peacekeeping operations.94 The 
Organization of American States (OAS), the major regional organization within Latin 
America, is no exception in this regard. Although the OAS charter has provisions for the 
pacific settlement of dispute, and conflict resolution in chapters V and VI, respectively, 
there is no specific mention of peacekeeping. Without a specific provision for 
peacekeeping operations, the capability to conduct and fund these operations is 
hampered. While the OAS has conducted different types of peacekeeping operations, 
from the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) in the Dominican Republic in 1965, to its 
role in the Central American peace process in the 1980’s and 1990’s, these operations 
have always depended on funding from one or more of the participants. The IAPF was 
heavily funded by the United States, for example. There is no reason to believe that the 
OAS will attempt to change the process for funding peacekeeping in the future. 
With the lack of operational funding ability of the OAS any future peacekeeping 
operation in Latin America would likely depend on financial contributions from its 
                                                 
94 John S. Clark, Keeping the Peace: Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping, (Montgomery, 
AL: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, 1996). 
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members. Looking specifically at the three nations in this study there would be varying 
degrees of willingness or ability to provide funding for such an operation.  
In the case of Argentina, particularly in the midst of the economic crisis of 2001-
2002, it would be hard pressed to join any operation in which it would be required to 
provide a great degree of funding. As discussed in chapter II, one of the motivating 
factors in Argentina’s increase in peacekeeping participation were the perceived 
economic incentives. Chile, on the other hand, may have the financial capability to fund 
its own part of a peacekeeping operation, but with its reluctance to become heavily 
involved in peacekeeping, it is less likely they will have the political will to take part. Of 
the three nations, Brazil is the most likely to have both the political will and financial 
capability to engage in a regional peacekeeping operation. 
B. REGIONAL HEGEMON  
There is arguably no other region in the world that has to contend as much with a 
regional hegemon as the members of the Western Hemisphere. With the most powerful 
nation in the world, the United States, in their own back yard, the nations of Latin 
America are always mindful of the actions of the giant to the North. For example, Latin 
American countries were reluctant to use the OAS for peacekeeping in Central America 
in the late 1980’s because they felt the United States had too much influence in the 
organization. 95 As addressed earlier, Brazil is the most likely Southern Cone nation to 
successfully confront the United States and to act independently of US policy. This 
would most likely be true in a future Latin American regional peacekeeping mission as 
well. Chile would be the second most likely to maintain a policy independent of the 
United States, as evidenced by their resistance to US pressure to increase peacekeeping 
participation. Finally, Argentina, especially with their current economic crisis, would be 
the least likely of the countries to challenge the regional hegemon. 
C. HIGHER STAKES OF THE PARTICIPANT NATIONS 
The fact that nations have a greater interest in affairs within their region is no 
surprise. This is particularly true today when economic interests are often tied up in 
                                                 
95 Walter Dorn, “Regional Peacekeeping is Not the Way,” Peacekeeping and International 
Relations 27, no. 2, (1998) p. 1. 
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regional blocs such as Mercosur. The greater the degree of economic integration in a 
region, the greater the stakes will be in taking part in a peacekeeping operation. In the 
case of Latin America, the move towards a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas will 
further link the nations of the region. In addition to the economic interests that a nation 
may have in a target country, an important consideration of decision makers, particularly 
democratic ones, is the importance of pub lic opinion, which may increase in the case of a 
regional peacekeeping where troops are sent into neighboring countries rather than far 
away regions.  
D. CONCLUSIONS: PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING 
1. Argentina  
It is clear that of the three countries examined in this thesis, Argentina has been 
the most active in peacekeeping operations. However, this high level of activity does not 
readily predict whether Argentina would take part in a peacekeeping operation in Latin 
America. As evidenced in the data one of Argentina’s biggest motivators for 
peacekeeping has been establishing a positive international image in order to extract 
concrete gains from the international community. Primary among the countries that 
Argentina has attempted to curry favor with is the United States. Additionally, Argentina 
has used peacekeeping as a way of gaining concrete financial rewards. Regional 
peacekeeping is not likely to afford Argentina the international exposure, nor the 
financial rewards it has enjoyed with international peacekeeping. For this reason 
Argentine contributions to a regional peacekeeping operation would not likely be as 
generous as with international peacekeeping. An additional factor likely to affect 
Argentina’s participation in future peacekeeping in the region is the economic crisis that 
the country is experiencing as of the beginning of 2002. Unless it can rebound from this 
major crisis, chances of Argentina playing a large role in a regional peacekeeping 
operation are minimal, particularly if the burden of funding fell on Argentina itself.  
2. Brazil 
Although Brazil has not been as aggressive in sending troops to peacekeeping 
operations as Argentina, it has done its fair share of international peacekeeping. As 
evidenced by Brazil’s history of participation in UN and other peacekeeping operations, 
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it is clear that Brazil has the will and the ability to participate and lead global 
peacekeeping operations. With a great degree of experience in peacekeeping operations, 
and the largest military in Latin America, Brazil could potentially lead a major 
peacekeeping operation in the region. One of the aspects that stands out when discussing 
Brazilian peacekeeping has been the propensity for the Brazilians to fill positions of 
leadership in these operations. One of the reasons Brazil may be reluctant to take part in 
regional peacekeeping is its adherence to a principle of non- intervention in the Western 
Hemisphere. This is particularly true if the US is somehow involved in the operation. On 
the other hand, Brazil does aspire to be a leader in Latin America and non- involvement in 
an operation supported by most Latin American nations might work against this 
aspiration. In the end, the likelihood of Brazilian participation would be increased if it 
were guaranteed a position of leadership in the operation. One of the recent successes of 
regional peacekeeping, MOMEP had a Brazilian general as mission commander, as did 
the IAFP mission in the Dominican Republic in 1965. US decision makers would be wise 
to consider Brazil’s aspiration for leadership when formulating a regional peacekeeping 
plan in Latin America.  
3. Chile 
Chile’s potential for being a leader in peacekeeping operations in Latin America 
is hampered by its traditional national defense policy, (promoted by an autonomous 
military) and its strict interpretation of peacekeeping operations. First of all the operation 
would have to clearly fall under peacekeeping as defined by Chapter 6 of the UN charter 
in order to be considered. Furthermore, assuming the operation is deemed worthy of 
participation, it would most likely not involve a large contingent of troops, in keeping 
with Chilean peacekeeping policy. Based on the above criteria it seems unlikely that 
Chile would be a major contributor to a peacekeeping operation in its own region. 
4. Conclusion 
After reviewing the available data it seems clear that Brazil, and not Argentina, is 
the best candidate to lead and provide funding for a regional peacekeeping operation in 
Latin America. Although the balance of power between civilian and military leaders in 
Brazil remains ambiguous, it appears that peacekeeping provides enough incentive to 
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both sides to make it a viable secondary mission. Additionally, although peacekeeping is 
not viewed as the major foreign policy strategy, it does meet the needs of the foreign 
policy makers in terms of providing Brazil a platform for show casing its leadership 
ability. As for the funding of a regional operation, Brazil’s military budget is relatively 
healthy as is its overall economy, making it able, at least for a limited time to fund its 
portion of a peacekeeping operation. Finally, it is the nation in the best position to act 
independently of US policy, which would help that a future regional operation is not 
unduly influenced by the regional hegemon.   
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR US POLICY 
In the case of a regional peacekeeping operation in Latin America, the 
participation of countries from within the region would ease the peacekeeping burden of 
the United States. It is in the best interest of the United States to encourage the 
participation of Latin American countries, and due to the importance of the Southern 
Cone, these countries require particular attention from policy makers. The conclusions of 
this study result in several implications for US policy makers. These implications are as 
follows: 1) a regional peacekeeping operation would require heavy funding from either 
the United States or the UN, 2) the United States must consider its position as the 
regional hegemon when dealing with Southern Cone countries, and 3) the United States 
must emphasize the high stakes involved in maintaining regional stability. 
As stated above, the OAS does not have any procedures in place to fund 
peacekeeping operations. Additionally, of the Southern Cone nations only Brazil is likely 
to have the political will and ability to provide funding for a regional operation. 
Argentina is in no position to fund any additional military ventures and although Chile 
may be able to do so, its political will is questionable. With this in mind, it is likely that 
the United States would be expected to provide a large portion of the funding, if not 
personnel, for a regional peacekeeping operation. 
Another important consideration for the United States is its position as the 
regional hegemon. The United States can often use its political might to get other 
countries to accept its policies, however this may not always be the case in the Southern 
Cone. Rather, United States policy makers should be aware of the potential drawbacks of 
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assuming the posture of the regional hegemon. Brazil in particular is very sensitive to 
United States involvement in Latin American affairs and as stated earlier, may be more 
easily convinced to share the burden in peacekeeping, if it is given a share of the 
leadership. Chile too has at times non-concurred with US policy. American policy makers 
would get the most out of Brazil and Chile by treating them as equals. Of the three 
countries, Argentina is the least likely to oppose US hegemony in the region. As 
demonstrated, Argentina has already demonstrated a pattern of alignment with the United 
States and the current economic crisis is likely to reinforce this pattern. 
Finally, the best chance for the United States in garnering support for Southern 
Cone participation in regiona l peacekeeping is by emphasizing the high stakes each 
country has in such an operation. With greater economic integration of the region, 
countries will have a high interest in maintaining regional stability. The United States 
should reinforce the fact that instability in one country in the region will have 
repercussions in all other countries, and therefore it is vital for Southern Cone countries 
to do their part in a regional peacekeeping operation.        
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